Fallo
de la Corte de EEUU en el caso EM LTD y MML Capital, LTD vs. República
Argentina
UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER THIS SUMMARY
ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER AND MAY NOT BE CITED
AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED
TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER
COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY
CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse at Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of May, two thousand
five.
PRESENT: HONORABLE JON O. NEWMAN, HONORABLE JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, HONORABLE
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EM LTD.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 05-1525-cv (L), -1642-cv, ETC.
THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA,
Defendant-Appellee,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NML CAPITAL, LTD.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 05-1543-cv (L), -1544-cv (CON)
REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA,
Defendant-Appellee.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
APPEARING FOR APPELLANTS: David W. Rivkin, Debevoise &
Plimpton, LLP, New York, N.Y.
Charles Fried, Cambridge, Mass.
APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: Jonathan I. Blackman, Cleary,
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New
York, N.Y.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
EM, Ltd. v. Rep. of Argentina - 05-1525-cv (L)
NML Capital v. Rep. of Argentina - 05-1543-cv (L)
- 2 -
District of New York (Thomas P. Griesa, District Judge).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the orders of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
This Order concerns expedited appeals from the March 29, 2005, orders
of the District Court vacating a restraining notice in No. 05-1525 and
vacating an order of attachment in No. 05-1543. The restraining notice
had been obtained by Plaintiff-Appellant EM Ltd. in aid of its judgment
for approximately $700 million against the Defendant-Appellee Republic
of Argentina (“Argentina”). See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
382 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2004). The order of attachment had been obtained
by Plaintiff-Appellant NML Capital, Ltd. in aid of its suit against
Argentina for principal and interest with respect to more than $170
million of Argentina bonds.
The vacation of the orders of restraint and attachment are sufficiently
in the nature of the denial of an injunction to give this Court appellate
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); United States v. All
Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1992).
The restraining notice was issued pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69, which
authorizes process to enforce judgments in accordance with “the
practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held.”
To enforce a money judgment, New York law provides for the issuance
of a restraining notice, which “may” be issued under specified
circumstances following specified procedures. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
5222 (McKinney 2004). The attachment was issued pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 64, which authorizes prejudgment
remedies “under the circumstances and in the manner provided by
the law of the state in which the district court is held.” N.Y.
EM, Ltd. v. Rep. of Argentina - 05-1525-cv (L) NML Capital v. Rep. of
Argentina - 05 1543-cv (L)
- 3 -
C.P.L.R. § 6201 specifies the circumstances under which an attachment
“may” be issued. The applicable state law procedures are
discretionary remedies. See, e.g., Bank of China, New York Branch v.
NBM L.L.C., 192 F. Supp. 2d 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(attachment).
The remedies
sought to attach and restrain the disposition of what the creditors
regard as property of Argentina in connection with a restructuring of
Argentina’s public debt to be accomplished through an issuance
of new bonds in exchange for a tender of more than $60 billion of old
bonds. The “property” is initially claimed to be Argentina’s
right to receive the tendered old bonds and then claimed to be the tendered
bonds themselves at the precise instant when they are surrendered to
Argentina for cancellation and issuance of the new bonds.
The parties have disputed a number of issues including whether the tendered
bonds can be regarded as assets or debts of Argentina and whether Argentina
is impermissibly trying to defeat the
collection efforts of the Plaintiffs-Appellants by using the threat
of a failure of the debt restructuring to fend off the restraint and
attachment remedies.
The District Court provided the following sufficient and dispositive
reason for vacating the restraint and attachment: If these attachments
[and restraints] are still in effect, we throw into doubt, to say the
least, the conclusion of the exchange offer.
NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 02 Civ. 3804, 2005 WL
743086, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2005). Exercising discretion EM, Ltd.
v. Rep. of Argentina - 05-1525-cv (L) NML Capital v. Rep. of Argentina
- 05-1543-cv (L)
- 4 -
with respect to pre- and post-judgment remedies, the District Court
acted well within its authority to vacate the remedies in order to avoid
a substantial risk to the successful conclusion of the debt restructuring.
That restructuring is obviously of critical importance to the economic
health of a nation.
We conclude that it is unnecessary to rule definitively on any of the
legal issues disputed by the parties. Even if the District Court’s
view on some of those issues was wrong, this is not a situation where
the Court’s exercise of discretion rested on an arguably incorrect
view of the law. As we understand the District Court, its ultimate conclusion
was that it would be an inappropriate exercise of the Court’s
discretionary authority to
leave in place pre- and post-judgment remedies that the Court reasonably
believed posed a risk to the completion of the debt restructuring. The
District Court declined to use its discretionary authority in a manner
that would entail such a risk, and we will not disturb the Court’s
exercise of its discretion.
The orders vacating the orders of restraint and attachment are affirmed.
The motion to certify the District Court’s ruling for appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is denied as moot.
FOR THE COURT, ROSEANN B. MacKECHNIE,
|